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IV.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The following questions are presented to the Supreme
Court for review:
1.

Should certiorari be granted where the decision of

the Utah Court of Appeals (for the first time in Anglo-Saxon legal
history) condones private parties entering a private home through
trickery?
2.

Is certiorari proper where the Court of Appeals has

decided an important issue of state law which has not been settled
by the Supreme Court? This question is whether emotional distress
damages are recoverable in a fraud case.

As the Court of Appeals

stated in its opinion: "Whether emotional distress damages are
recoverable for fraud is a question of first impression under Utah
law." (185 Utah Adv. Rptr. at p. 18.)

That important question

should be decided by the Supreme Court.
3.

Is certiorari proper where the Court of Appeals has

decided a question of state law in a way that is in conflict with
a decision of the Supreme Court?

Jackie Turner asserts that the

standard of review espoused by the Court of Appeals conflicts with
the Supreme Court's opinions in Koer v. Mayfair Markets, 19 Utah 2d
339, 431 P.2d 566 (1967); Management Committee v. Graystone Pines.
Inc., 652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982); and Rovlance v. Davies. 18 Utah 2d

1

295, 424 P.2d 142 (1967).

The confusion should be resolved by the

Supreme Court.
V.
OFFICIAL REPORTS
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reported at Turner
v. General Adjustment Bureau. Inc. et al., 185 Utah Adv. Rptr. 16
(Utah Ct. App. 1992), as Exhibit A.

VI.
GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals opinion was filed on April 22, 1992.
By stipulation of all parties to this appeal, the time within which
to file a Petition for Writ of Certiorari was extended to June 19,
1992.
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the decision
of the Court of Appeals by writ of certiorari under Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2 and Rules 45-51 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

VII.
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF LAW
The controlling provisions of law in this case are case
law citations designated in the Argument section of this Petition.
Constitutions, statutes, ordinances, and regulations do not govern
this appeal.
2

VIII.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1
This action arises from a "pretext" surveillance investigation performed by a private detective firm ("Inteldex") through
its employees Dennis Dye and Ronnie Hyer.

The subject of the

investigation was James Turner, Jackie Turner's husband2.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals summarizes the facts
as follows:
On November 30, 1984, Turner's husband filed a
workers' compensation claim asserting that he
was injured in a work related accident. His
employer's workers' compensation insurance
carrier, Occidental Fire and Casualty Insurance Company, retained GAB to adjust the
claim.
GAB, in turn, hired Inteltech to
investigate the claim.
Inteltech employees, masquerading as representatives of a product marketing research
company, conducted an undercover investigation
of the claim over a period of approximately
three months. Utilizing the marketing company
facade, they gained access to the Turner home
to gather information about the activities of
Turner's husband3.
Inteltech
employees
visited the Turners at their home and asked
them to test various consumer products on a
*In this petition, "R." refers to the record; "T." refers to
the trial transcript, found at R. 953-955; "T. of H." refers to the
transcript of the May 4, 1990 hearing on Turner's motions for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial, found at
R. 952.
2

James and Jackie Turner were subsequently divorced.

3

The private detectives entered the home at least five times
under this same pretext. (T. 261-263.)
3

continuing basis.
In addition to testing
products, an Inteltech employee invited Turner
to participate in a shopping spree. However,
on the day the shopping spree was scheduled to
occur, Inteltech canceled it. Turner claims
that as a result of the invitation, she lost
approximately twenty dollars because she had
hired and paid a babysitter4.
185 Utah Adv. Rptr. at p. 17.
Jackie Turner then brought this action against the
defendants claiming fraud, invasion of privacy, and conspiracy. (R.
2-12.) The jury rendered a verdict against Turner on the fraud and
invasion of privacy claims; and therefore, did not reach the
conspiracy claim of damages. (R. 721-723; 894-897.)
After trial, Turner moved for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict or for a new trial on all issues submitted to the jury.
(R. 725-726; 818-819.)

The trial court granted judgment notwith-

standing the verdict and denied the motion for a new trial. (T. of
H. 19-29; R. 813, 890-893.)
jointly

and

severally,

The trial court entered judgment,

against

the defendants

on the fraud,

invasion of privacy, and conspiracy claims for $20 in out-of-pocket
expenses; $5,000 for general damages; and $3,000 for punitive
damages.

Turner moved to amend that judgment to allow the damage

issue to go to the jury. (R. 930-931.) The trial court denied that
motion to amend. (R. 935-937.)

4

The depth and sophistication of the ruse is shown by
plaintiff's trial exhibit 1 (Ex. B, hereto). Note that American
Marketing Research & Development is a wholly fictitious company.
4

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court1s grant
of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, concluding that (1) the
trial court erred in granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict;
(2) the trial court correctly refused to instruct the jury that
emotional distress damages are recoverable in a cause of action for
fraud; and (3) the trial court correctly admitted evidence of
Turner's psychiatric history and past drug use.

(See, Ex. A.)

IX.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS THE
FIRST TIME IN HISTORY THAT ANY ANGLO-SAXON
COURT HAS CONDONED ENTERING A PRIVATE HOME BY
TRICKERY
Certiorari may be granted where a decision of the Court
of Appeals " . . . has so far departed from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings. . . as to call for the exercise of
the Supreme Court's power of supervision.11
of Appellate Procedure.

Rule 46(c) Utah Rules

This is such a case.

In Semayne's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B.
1603) the court stated:
. . . that the house of every one is to him as
his castle and fortress, as well for his
defense against injury and violence, as for
his repose. . • •
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly endorsed
the importance of the axiom that, Ma manfs house is his castle."
5

Pavton v. New York. 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L. Ed.2d 1371
(1980)

(". . . unequivocal endorsement of the tenet that fa manfs

house is his castle1."); Weeks v. United States. 232 U.S. 383, 390,
34 S.Ct. 341, 343, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1913) ("The maxim that 'every
man's house is his castle,1. . . has always been looked upon as of
high value to the citizen.")
It has been 389 years since Semayne's case, supra.

In

that time, no Anglo-Saxon Court has ever approved or condoned the
entry of a private home by private citizens through trickery.
Indeed every case been to the contrary.
One of the leading cases on invasion of privacy is De May
v. Roberts. 9 N.W. 145 (Mich. 1881) .

De May is important here

because of its factual similarity to this case.

In that case, De

May, a doctor, brought a person named Scattergood with him to
assist in the delivery of the plaintiff's baby.

Upon arriving at

the plaintiffs home, De May did not properly identify Scattergood.
The plaintiff assumed Scattergood was also a doctor. As the court
outlined, De May and Scattergood were "bid to enter, treated kindly
and no objection whatever made to the presence of defendant
Scattergood.

. . . [B]oth of the defendants in all respects

throughout acted in a proper and becoming manner actuated by a
sense of duty and kindness." Id. at 147.

Affirming judgment for

the plaintiff based on Scattergood having witnessed the delivery,
the court explained:
6

It would be shocking to our sense of right,
justice and propriety to doubt even but that
for such an act the law would afford an ample
remedy . . . the plaintiff had a legal right
to the privacy of her apartment at such a time
and the law secures to her this right by
requiring others to observe it, and to abstain
from its violation.
The fact that at the
time, she consented to the presence of
Scattergood, supposing his to be a physician,
does not preclude her from maintaining an
action and recovering substantial damages upon
afterwards ascertaining his true character.
In obtaining admission at such a time and
under
such
circumstances
without
duly
disclosing his true character, both parties
were guilty of deceit, and the wrong thus done
entitles the injured party to recover damages
afterward sustained from shame and mortification upon discovering the true character of
the defendants.
Id. at 148-49; See also. Dietemann v. Time. Inc.. 284 F.Supp. 925
(D.C. Cal. 1968); Young v. Western & A.R. Co. . 39 Ga. App. 761, 148
S.E. 414 (1929) (search without warrant);

Thompson v. City of

Jacksonville 130 So.2d 105 (Fla. 1961) (same); Walker v. Whittle.
83 Ga. App. 445, 64 S.E.2d 87 (1951) (entry without legal authority
to arrest husband); Welsh v. Pr it chard. 125 Mont. 517, 241 P.2d 816
(1952) (landlord moving in on tenant); Ford Motor Co. v. Williams.
108 Ga. App. 21, 132 S.E.2d 206 (1963) reversed 219 Ga. 505, 134
S.E.2d 32, conformed to 108 Ga. App. 723, 134 S.E.2d 483 (entry
into plaintifffs home was held to be an invasion of her privacy,
even though he was not there at the time) ; Miller v. National
Broadcasting Co. 187 Cal. App.3d 1463, 232 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1987)
(Most individuals understand it is a crime or a tort or both to go
7

into a private home without consent.); State v. Hyem. 630 P.2d 202
(Mont 1981);

Hester v. Barnett. 723 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. App. 1987),

c.f., Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B Illustration 4:
A is seeking evidence for use in a civil
action he is bringing against B. He goes to
the bank in which B has his personal account,
exhibits a forged court order, and demands to
be allowed to examine the bank's records of
the account. The bank submits to the order
and permits him to do so. A has invaded B f s
privacy.
If this decision stands, it will be the first time in the
history of Anglo-Saxon law that any court anywhere has condoned
entry into a private home by private parties through trickery.
Likely, private detectives all over the U.S. will cite this case to
justify similar schemes of trickery5.
POINT II
CERTIORARI IS PROPER BECAUSE THE COURT OF
APPEALS DECIDED AN IMPORTANT ISSUE OF STATE
LAW,
WHICH HAS NOT BEEN, BUT SHOULD BE,
DECIDED BY THE SUPREME COURT
In this case, the Court of Appeals addressed an issue of
first impression in Utah:

whether emotional distress damages are

recoverable in an action for fraud.

The Court of Appeals ruled in

the negative; however, there is a split of authority on the issue.
5

The private detective firm (Inteltech) has prepared a packet
which justifies the legality of this type of pretext surveillance
for potential customers. (T. 103.) The opinion of the Utah Court
of Appeals will surely go into that packet for all future customers
across the U.S. to see. At the time of trial, Inteltech had fifty
to one hundred such pretext investigations in process. (T. 100.)
8

A thorough analysis of this issue was undertaken by
Professor Andrew L. Merritt of the University of Illinois College
of Law in his well-reasoned

law review article, Damages for

Emotional Distress in Fraud Litigation; Dignitary Torts in a
Commercial Society, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 1 (1989).
In that article, Professor Merritt discusses the existing
case law on this issue:
The proper measure of fraud damages always has
been a matter of controversy. . . . Relatively
few cases have considered the propriety of
awarding damages for non-pecuniary loss. . . .
Though a substantial body of precedent now
addresses this issue, no judicial consensus
has emerged.]
Id. at 3. Based on a detailed analysis of policy issues, Professor
Merritt concludes:
Balancing these interests suggests that, as a
general rule, emotional distress damages
should be awarded in fraud actions.
This issue of first impression should be addressed by the
Utah Supreme Court.
POINT III
CERTIORARI IS PROPER BECAUSE THE COURT OF
APPEALS DECIDED A QUESTION OF STATE LAW IN A
WAY THAT IS IN CONFLICT WITH DECISIONS OF THE
UTAH SUPREME COURT
When a court grants a judgment

notwithstanding

the

verdict, the standard of appellate review is the same standard
which applies when passing upon a motion for directed verdict. Koer
9

v, Mavfair Markets. 19 Utah 2d 338, 342, 431 P.2d 566 (1967).

A

directed verdict is appropriate when "reasonable minds would not
differ

on

the

facts

to

be

determined,

from

the

evidence

presented6." See. Management Committee v. Graystone Pines. Inc..
652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982).
This was the standard applied by the trial court.

In

granting the judgment notwithstanding the verdict, Judge Wilkinson
stated "no reasonable minds could have differed on the evidence
which was presented to [the jury]." (185 Utah Adv. Rptr. at p. 17.)
The Court of Appeals, however, concluded that judgment
notwithstanding the verdict is only justified if, "after looking at
the evidence and all of its reasonable inferences in a light most
favorable to the party moved against, the trial court concludes
that there is no competent evidence which would support a verdict
in his favor." (185 Utah Adv. Rptr. at p. 17.)

The Court of

Appeals cites Gustaveson v. Gregg. 655 P.2d 693 (Utah 1982) and
King

v.

Fereday,

739

P.2d

618

(Utah

1987)

to

support

its

conclusion.
The difference between those two standards is significant.

There are many cases where there may be some evidence to

support the verdict, but the overwhelming weight of the evidence is

6

Koer states the test slightly differently: " . . . the absence
of any substantial evidence to support the verdict." 19 Utah 2d at
342.
10

such that reasonable minds really could not differ on the evidence
presented•
This confusion and inconsistency in the standard of
review should be resolved by the Supreme Court.
X.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in Points I, II, and III, the
Supreme Court should grant certiorari in this case to review the
opinion of the Court of Appeals.

DATED this

a

day of June, 1992.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Appellee/CrossAppellant

11

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the
foregoing PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI were mailed, postage
prepaid, this

//

day of June, 1992 to the following:

Robert L. Stevens
Michael L. Schwab
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
P.O. BOX 2465
Salt Lake City, UT 84110
Craig L. Barlow
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145

/-i
/'

,--

r\

/

/ / !Z

A,^
2847-074\jn

12

/

EXHIBIT A

police, compare nazzoia, *V*L r.za ai ^oo;
Moore, 284 F. Supp. at 727-28; People v.
Kelly, 195 Cal.App.2d 669, 16 Cal. Rptr. 177
(1961); People v. Cohen, 57 Misc. 2d 366, 292
N.Y.S.2d 706 (1968); Commonwealth v.
McCloskey, 217 Pa.Super. 432, 272 A.2d 271
(1970). Nor did university officials attempt to
delegate their right to inspect rooms to the
police, which would result in the circumvention of traditional restrictions on police activity. Compare Piazzola, 442 F.2d at 286;
Moore, 284 F. Supp. at 728; Kelly, 16 Cal.
Rptr. at 179; McCloskey, 272 A.2d at 272. In
light of the recurring troubles with vandalism
and other damage that had occurred on
Hunter's floor, Smith alone made the decision
to conduct a room-to-room search for
university purposes, without any input from
the university police. .The sole purpose of
Officer Milne's presence was to provide assistance in the event that Smith confronted
problems he was not able to handle on his
own. Thus, no action was taken which would
promote circumvention of constitutional restrictions placed on police action.
CONCLUSION
The search undertaken to protect the university's interest in maintaining a safe and
proper educational environment, as well to
fulfill the requirements of the housing contract, was reasonable. Accordingly, we reverse
the trial court's determination that evidence of
the stolen property found in Hunter's room
should be suppressed. Additionally, since the
trial court's sole ground in suppressing
Hunter's confession is based on its erroneous
determination that the stolen property should
be suppressed, that determination is also reversed. This matter is remanded to the trial
court for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
> V! 7
Leonard H. Russon, Judge
'
WE CONCUR:
,'^-'" '".
'
Regnal W. Garff, Judge
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

1971); Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. 777 (W.D.
Mich. 1975); Morale v. GrigcU 422 F. Supp. 988,
(D. N.H. 1976); People v. Cohen, 57 Misc. 2d 366,
292 N.Y.S.2d 706 (1968).
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GENERAL ADJUSTMENT BUREAU, INC.;
Oak Norton; and Inteldex Corporation, d/
b/a InteltechServices, '
Defendants, Appellants, and CrossAppellees*
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No. 910587-CA
FILED: April 22,1992
Third District, Salt Lake County
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson .
ATTORNEYS:
Craig L. Barlow, Salt Lake City, for General
Adjustment Bureau
Robert L~ Stevens and Michael L. Schwab,
Salt Lake City, for Oak Norton and
Inteldex .
Gordon K. Jensen, West Valley City, and
Glen A. Cook, Salt Lake City, for Jackie
Turner ."-^ - •
Before Judges Garff, Greenwood, and
Russon.1 \ "/'
';'
y
This opinion is subject to revision before .
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
GARFF, Judge:

Defendants, General Adjustment. Bureau
(GAB), Inteldex Corporation, d/b/a Intel1. Utah Xode Ann. §76-6-404 (1990) enumerates tech (Inteltech), and Oak Norton (Norton)
the elements of theft; Utah Code Ann. §76-6- appeal the trial court's judgment notwithsta412(l)(d) (1990) provides that if the value of the nding the verdict (j-n.o.v.) in favor of plainproperty stolen is $100 or less, then theft of such tiff, Jackie Turner (Turner), and the punitive
constitutes a class B misdemeanor.
,
2. The State further argues that even if the warran- damages award. Turner cross appeals, assertless search did violate Hunter's constitutional ting that the trial court erred (1) by refusing to
rights, the trial court nonetheless erred in suppres- instruct the jury that emotional distress
sing Hunter's confession on the basis that, but for damages are recoverable in a cause of action
the entry and seizure of the property, Hunter would for fraud, (2) by admitting evidence concernot have confessed to the theft. Because of our ning Turner's past drug use and psychological
resolution of the search issue, we need not address history, and (3) by refusing, after granting
the State's argument on this second issue.
j.n.o.v., to submit the issue of damages to the
3. Compare, e.g., Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. jury. We reverse.,
of Troy State Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725, 729 (M.D.
Ala. 1968); State v. Kappes, 26 Ariz. App. 567, 550
P.2d 121, 124 (1976); People v. Kelly, 195
Cal.App.2d 669, 16 CaJ. Rptr. 177 (1961); People v.
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS

FACTS
could have differed on the evidence which was
On November 30, 1984, Turner's husband presented to [the jury] .... And it was highly
lied a workers' compensation claim asserting offensive to this Court for the defendants to
hat he was injured in a workrelated accident, do what they did to [Turner]." As to the claim
iis employer's workers' compensation insu- of fraud, the court found that Turner proved
ance carrier, Occidental Fire and Casualty damages in the amount of twenty dollars for
nsurance Company, retained GAB to adjust the babysitter. The court, however, found that
he claim. GAB, in turn, hired Inteltech to Turner's evidence concerning damages for lost
nvestigate the claim.
work time was "too speculative."
Inteltech employees, masquerading as reprThe court entered judgment, jointly and
esentatives of a product marketing research severally, against GAB and Inteltech on the
:ompany, conducted an undercover investig- fraud, invasion of privacy, and conspiracy
ition of the claim over a period of approxi- claims in the following amounts: $20.00 for
nately three months. Utilizing the marketing out-of-pocket damages; $5,000.00 for
:ompany facade, they gained access to the general damages; $3,000.00 for punitive
Turner home to gather information about the damages; post-judgment interest; and attoictivities of Turner's husband. Inteltech rney fees. The trial court further found
tmployees visited the Turners at their home Norton to be personally liable for the entire
ind asked them to test "various consumer I amount of the judgment. Turner moved to
)roducts on a continuing basis. In addition to amend the judgment to allow the damages
esting products, an Inteltech employee invited issues to go to the jury. The court denied the
Turner to participate in a shopping spree, motion.
'
•'• '
iowever, on the day the shopping spree was
STANDARD OF REVIEW .
cheduled to occur, Inteltech cancelled it.
A j.n.o.v. can be granted only when the
Turner claims that as a result of the invitation,
he lost approximately twenty dollars because losing party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 17
he had hired and paid a babysitter.
Turner further claims that as a result of her (Utah 1988). In other words, j.n.o.v. "is only
inwitting participation in the undercover justified if, after looking at the evidence and
nvestigation, she lost time she could have all of its reasonable inferences in a light most
pent working. Turner's work consisted of favorable to the party moved against, the trial
asks performed for her landlord on a by-the- court concludes that there is no competent
ob basis, for which she received rent credits.
evidence which would support a verdict in his
On July 20, 1987, at a hearing on the favor." Gustaveson v. Gregg, 655 P.2d 693,
vorkers' compensation claim of Turner's 695 (Utah 1982); King v. Fereday, 739 P.2d
uisband, Inteltech employees appeared and 618, 620 (Utah 1987). On appeal, we apply the
estified about information gathered through same standard. Gustaveson, 655 P.2d at 695;
he undercover investigation. It was then that King, 739 P.2d at 620. In determining whether
Turner first became aware that Inteltech competent evidence supports the verdict, we
employees had represented themselves as accept as true all testimony and reasonable
narket researchers for the purpose of invest- inferences flowing therefrom that tend to
gating her husband's claim. After the prove defendants' case, and we disregard all
tearing, the administrative law judge denied conflicts and evidence that tend to disprove
he workers'compensation claim.
defendants' case. Koer v. May fair Mkts., 19
Turner sued, claiming fraud, invasion of Utah 2d 339,431 P.2d 566,568-69 (1967).
privacy, and conspiracy. She sought special,
FRAUD
;eneral, and punitive damages. The case was
Defendants
contend
that the trial court
ried to a jury on March 12 through 14,1990.
erred
in
granting
j.n.o.v.
because competent
At the close of Turner's case, defendants
evidence
supported
the
jury's
verdict of no
noved for a directed verdict, which the court
fraud
in
that
Turner
was
not
damaged
as a
lenied. Turner, in turn, moved for a directed
erdict at the close of defendants' cases, result of the undercover investigation.
To establish fraud, a party must prove by
vhich the court took under advisement. The
ssues of fraud, invasion of privacy, conspi- clear and convincing evidence each of the
acy, and Norton's personal liability were following elements: (1) a representation was
ubmitted to the jury. The jury rendered a J made; (2) concerning a presently existing
erdict against Turner on both the fraud and material fact; (3) which was false; (4) which
nvasion of privacy claims, and therefore, did the representor either (a) knew to be false, or
lot reach the conspiracy claim and damages (b) made recklessly, knowing that there was
ssues. Thereafter/Turner moved for j.n.o.v. insufficient knowledge upon which to base
md for a new trial on all issues submitted to such a representation; (5) for the purpose of
inducing the other party to act upon it; (6)
he jury.
^
» ?:•
, ythat the other party, acting reasonably and in
After oral argument, the trial court granted ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely
.n.o.v. and denied the motion for a new trial.
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(9) to that party's injury and damage.1 Mikkelson v. Quail Valley Realty, 641 P.2d 124,
126 (Utah 1982); Pace v. Parris/i, 122 Utah
141,144-45,247 P.2d 273,274-75 (1952).
The trial court in the instant case applied
the wrong standard in granting j.n.o.v.
Instead of determining whether competent
evidence supported the verdict, see, e.g., King
v. Fereday, 739 P.2d 618, 620 (Utah 1987), the
court found that no reasonable minds could
have differed on the evidence presented.
Viewing the evidence in favor of defendants,
we conclude that substantial competent evidence supported the jury's verdict of no cause
of action for fraud. Turner's evidence that she
sustained damage when she hired and paid a
babysitter apparently was not, as viewed by
the jury, clear and convincing. At trial, when
asked how - much she paid the babysitter.
Turner vaguely and equivocally testified, "I
think it was like twenty bucks or something
like that .... It was reasonable." Furthermore,
Turner did not identify the babysitter nor did
she produce evidence of payment as claimed.
Finally, competent evidence supported the
jury's implied finding that Turner did not
sustain any lost work time damages. Consistent with the jury's finding, the court found
this claim to be "too speculative" inasmuch as
it was based solely on Turner's unsubstantiated assertions of lost work time. Because the
jury had competent evidence to support its
verdict that no fraud occurred,2 the trial court
erred in. granting j.n.o.v. on the claim;.of
fraud.3

unless no competent evidence supports the
verdict. Id.
After viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences flowing therefrom in a light
most favorable to defendants, see Koer v.
Mayfair Mkts., 19 Utah 2d 339, 431 P.2d 566,
568-69 (1967), we conclude that competent
evidence supported the jury's verdict of no
invasion of privacy. The record discloses first,
that the purpose and scope of the undercover
investigation was limited to gathering information concerning the workers' compensation
claim.8 Second, at no time did Inteltech representatives enter Turner's home without her
permission. Third, the investigation visits were
relatively short. Fourth, Turner's credibility
was called into question by competent evidence. Based on the foregoing, the jury could
reasonably conclude, as it apparently did, that
Inteltech employees did not substantially
intrude in a manner that would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person. Therefore,
the trial court erred by granting j.n.o.v. on the
invasion of privacy claim.

EMOTIONAL DISTRESS DAMAGES FOR
FRAUD
Turner cross appeals, claiming that the trial
court erred by refusing to instruct the jury
that emotional distress damages may be recovered in a fraud action. A challenge to a trial
court's refusal to give a jury instruction presents questions of law. Ramon By and
Through Ramon v. Farr, 770 P.2d 131, 133
(Utah 1989). Consequently, we do not defer to
the trial court's rulings. Id. We affirm such a
refusal when the proposed instruction does not
INVASION OF PRIVACY
"; Defendants claim that competent evidence properly and fairly state the law as applied to
supported the jury's verdict that there was no the facts of the case. Id. at 133-34. r: ••
invasion of Turner's privacy. Invasion of
Whether emotional distress damages are
privacy as a common law tort has developed recoverable for fraud is a question of first
into four distinct,.torts.4 However, Turner's impression under Utah law. Authorities are
cause of action.is based only on the tort of split on this issue. Illustrative of decisions not
intrusion upon sedusion..: ? •-.. - allowing recovery of . emotional . distress
To establish an invasion of privacy claim of damages in a fraud action are Cornell v.
intrusion upon seclusion,5 a complaining party Wunschel, 408 N.W.2d 369, 382 (Iowa 1987);
must prove by a preponderance of the evid- Carrigg v. Blue, 323 S.E.2d 787, 789 n.l (S.C.
ence an intentional substantial intrusion, Ct. App. 1984); Vmphrey v. Sprinkel, 682
physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or P.2d 1247, 1258-59 (Idaho 1983); Ellis v.
seclusion of the complaining party that would Crockett, 451 P.2d 814, 820 (Haw. 1969); and
be highly offensive to the reasonable person.* Harsche v. Czyz, 61 N.W.2d 265, 272 (Neb.
Restatement (Second) of-Torts §652B & cmt^ 1953). In contrast, Kilduff v. Adams, Inc.,
d (1977); accord W. Page Keeton et a/., Prosser 593 A.2d 478, 484 (Conn. 1991); Trimble v.
and Keeton on the Law of
Torts, City of Denver, 697 P.2d 716,, 730 (Colo.
§117, at 855 (5th ed. 1984). The language 1985); Crowley v. Global Realty, Inc., 474
"highly offensive to the reasonable person" A.2d 1056, 1058 (N.H. 1984); McRae v.
suggests a determination of fact for which a Bolstad, 646 P.2d 771,-775-76 (Wash. Ct.
jury is uniquely qualified. See Cruz v. App. 1982), afPd, 676 P.2d -496 (Wash.
Montoya; 660 P.2d 723, 729 (Utah 1983). In 1984); and Rosener v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
determining issues of fact,7 a'jury necessarily 168 Cal. Rptr-s 237, 246 (1980), appeal dismiaccepts the testimony of certain witnesses and ssed, 450 U.S. 1051, 101 S. Ct. 1772 (1981)
discounts conflicting: testimony. Fillmore illustrate decisions allowing such recovery.
Prods, v. Western States Paving, 592 P.2d ' As - - indicated above, -• many jurisdictions
581, 582 (Utah 1979). On appeal, we will not follow the rule that. emotional distress
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n for fraud. Cf. First Sec. Bank of Utah
B.J. Feedyards, Inc., 653 P.2d 591, 598
h 1982) (emotional distress damages "are
ctreme remedy, which should be dispensed
caution"). This rule stems from the prie that fraud, as an economic tort, protonly pecuniary losses. Walsh v. Ingersolli Co., 656 F.2d 367, 370 (8th Cir. 1981).
•rding to a leading treatise on remedies:
[Djeceit is an economic, not a dignitary tort, and resembles, in the
interests it seeks to protect, a contract claim more., than a tort claim. ,„
For this reason, though strong men •
may cry at the loss of money, separate recovery for mental anguish is usually denied in deceit cases, just
as it is denied in contract cases, '
simply because emotional distress, ^
though resulting naturally.. enough .^^
from many frauds, is not one of the .n"
interests the law ordinarily seeks to •• ^
protect in deceit cases.
<
•----r
>obbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies,
at 602 (1973) (footnotes omitted); see
Pihakis v. CottreU, 243 So.2d 685, 692
1971) ("plaintiff must show ... actual
niary loss as the result of the fraud"); Jurv. General Motors Corp., 539 S.W.2d
600-01 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) ("deceit
lgs to that class of tort of which pecunloss constitutes a part of the cause of
n").
. ,.. u ,v.
tder section 525 .„ of the Restatement
>nd) of Torts, - "One who fraudulently
s a misrepresentation of fact,>... is
xt to liability to the other in deceit for
niary loss." (Emphasis added.) Furthert, in addressing the measure of damages
fraudulent misrepresentation, section 549
le Restatement states, "The recipient of a
lulent misrepresentation is entitled to
'er ..: the pecuniary loss r.V of which the
^presentation is a legal cause, including"
lifference between the value of what was
/ed in the transaction and its purchase
and "pecuniary loss suffered otherwise as
^sequence of ... the misrepresentation."
itement (Second) of Torts §549(1 )(a) and
1977) (emphasis added).: While the Restcm does not specifically exclude emotidistress damages in a cause of action for
[, the repeated references to "pecuniary
implicitly'- excludes: such ^recovery. R.
i, Recovery of "Damages for .Fraud 156
)..

:
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ismuch as fraud is an economic tort dirtowards redressing pecuniary losses, Cor408 N.W^d at ,382; Walsh, 656 F.2d
0, we conclude that the better reasoned
>ach is to disallow recovery of emotional
ss damages in a fraud action. As a result,
ial court correctly refused to instruct the

EVIDENCE OF PSYCHIATRIC HISTORY
AND PAST DRUG USE
On cross appeal, Turner claims that the trial
court erred by admitting evidence concerning
her psychiatric history and past drug use.
Whether evidence is admissible is a question of
law reviewed under a correctness standard. Stare
v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 n.3 (Utah
1991).*
Turner contends that the trial court erred in
admitting evidence of her psychiatric history
and past drug use because the evidence was
irrelevant. Evidence is relevant if it has "any
tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence." .Utah R.
Evid. 401. Quite clearly* the evidence pertaining to Turner's psychiatric'history and past
drug use was relevant to the determination of
whether her claimed emotional distress
damages under her invasion of privacy claim
were the result,of a preexisting condition or
were caused by defendants' conduct. ,
Turner contends that even if the evidence
relating to her psychiatric history and past
drug use were relevant,, the court erred in
admitting it because the prejudicial effect of
the evidence outweighed its probative value.
Under Utah Rule of Evidence 403,.relevant
evidence may.be excluded if "its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice.".The trial court's determination that evidence, is admissible under
Rule 403 is reviewed for correctness, "[b]ut in
deciding whether the trial court erred as a
matter of law, we de facto grant it some discretion, because we reverse only if we conclude that it acted unreasonably in striking the
balance." Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781 n.3. In
Terry, x. Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 60S
P.2d 314 (Utah 1979), rev'd on other grounds,'
McFarland v.Skaggs Cos., 678 P.2d 298,304
(Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court defined
evidence that is "unfairly prejudicial" as evidence having.', "V- V-*
^ - \>~. '• .1
v"a tendency to influence the outcome ,..:
•«•' of the trial by improper means, or
if it appeals to the jury's sympat- hies, or arouses its sense of horror, * !
;*• provokes its instinct to punish or
'
^Qotherwise causes a jury to base its
:~ .decision on something other than ,'
^ • the. established propositions of the
• v. case*., :<:-.& ,. « * -•..-,- . .:> -v. . .-•,..-...
Jtf.at323ri.31:
r

lW

;>"- -JS*-;---~ '• \^^
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- The evidence involving Turner's psychiatric
history and past drug: use was probative of
whether -her claimed emotional distress
damages were the result of a preexisting condition or were caused by defendants' conduct.
Having reviewed the trial court's determina-
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uwii iii<&i tut uaiigci ui uniair prejudice aiQ
not substantially outweigh the evidence's
probative value, we conclude, in light of the
discretion given to a trial court in performing
a Rule 403 balancing, that the court correctly
admitted the evidence.
Finally, pursuant to the tort law doctrine
commonly referred to as the "thin-skull" or
"eggshell skull" rule,10 Turner argues that
because defendants are required to take her as
they find her, the court abused its discretion in
admitting evidence of her psychiatric history
and past drug use. This argument fails
because, "even though it is true that one who
injures another takes him as he is, nevertheless
the plaintiff may not recover damages for any
pre-existing condition or disability she may
have had which did not result from any fault
of the defendant." Brunson v. Strong, 17 Utah
2d 364, 412 P.2d 451, 453 (1966) (footnote
omitted).
CONCLUSION
.:.<:
'
For the above-stated reasons, we conclude
that the trial court (1) erred in granting
j.n.o.v., (2) correctly refused to instruct the
jury that emotional distress damages are recoverable in a cause of action for fraud, and
(3) correctly admitted evidence concerning
Turner's psychiatric history and past drug use.
Other arguments raised by the parties need not
be considered in view of our decision herein.
Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial
court, and remand for judgment consistent
with the jury's verdict. No costs are awarded.
Regnal W. Garff, Judge
. r~

r.2<X 634, 640 (Utah App. 1987).

2. The failure to prove any of the previously mentioned elements of fraud is fatal to a complaining
party's case. Inasmuch as competent evidence supports the jury's implied finding of no damage, we
need not address arguments concerning other elements of fraud.
3. Assuming, arguendo, Turner could prove some
sort of damage under her fraud claim, as a complaining party, she still had a duty to mitigate
damages. Conder, 739 P.2d at 639. A complaining
party is not entitled to recover damages resulting
from wrongful conduct which could have been
avoided or minimized by reasonable means. Angelos
v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, 671 P.2d 772, 777
(Utah 1983); Conder, 739 P.2d at 639.
Defendants* evidence demonstrates that Turner
failed to mitigate the damages she claims to have
sustained by having to hire and pay a babysitter.
Turner testified that an Inteltech investigator called
and cancelled the shopping spree the day it was
scheduled. Other than the bald statement that the
babysitter still had to be paid, Turner gave no explanation why she could not cancel the babysitter or
otherwise minimize her damages.
4. In the classic article entitled Privacy, Prosser
enumerated the four torts under the right to privacy
as follows:

V..A»:

v

1. Intrusion upon the plaintiffs seclusion or solitude, or. into his private
affairs;
.:. ' 2. Public disclosure of embarrassing
:,'." private facts about the plaintiff; ..'.,
3. Publicity.which places the plaintiff '-*..r
' in a false light in the public eye; and
" 4 . Appropriation, for the defendant's' " '
advantage, of the plaintiffs name or
likeness.
- . .William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383,
389 (1960); Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 563 n.7
WE CONCUR:
(Utah 1988).
"- •:.
.:+
,;
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
lj:
5. There is little case law to assist us in the determLeonard H. Russon, Judge
ination we make today concerning Turner's invasion
of privacy claim. The most probable reason for this
. ; ; ; .. r. „„..r\ . . ' r-':••:•<
- .* v . :
1. GAB contends that Turner must prove substantial isbecause
. _ even today most individuals not acting
0
damage to recover under her claim of fraud. In
in some clearly identified.official capa-Mft:t
support, GAB cites to Dilworth v. Lauritzen, • 18
. ( city do not go .into,.private homes
Utah 2d 386, 424 PJtd 136, 138 (1967), where the
'.without the consent of those living "_
Utah Supreme Court, after stating that "one of the
there; not only do widely held notions
essential elements of fraud is that the plaintiff
of decency preclude it, but most indivi-^ '
sustain damages," cites to Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah
duals understand that to do so is either'*v~
141, 144-45, 247 P.2d 273, 274-75 (1952), and
a tort, a crime, or both. ' - "'\ ***•;
section 105 of the third edition of Prosser on Torts
(currently located at section 110 of the fifth edition Miller v. National Broadcasting Co., 232 Cal. Rptr.
of Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts). Alth- 668,678-79 (Ct. App. 1986) (footnotes omitted).
ough section 110 of Prosser and Keeton on the Law 6. Once a party establishes a cause of action for
of Torts supports the proposition that substantial invasion of privacy, that party recovers, for mental
damage is required before a fraud or deceit cause of distress damages proved, if such damages are.the
action can arise, see W*. Page Keeton et a/., Prosser kind that -normally result from such an invasion.
and Keeton on the Law of Torts, §110, at 765 & Restatement (Second) of Torts §652H(b) (1977); see
n.l (5th ed. 1984), GAB reads Dilworth too also Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equip. Co/,
broadly. Utah law requires that a party sustain only 291 P.2d 194, 198 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955) ('the fact
some injury or damage. See Mikkelson v. Quail that damages resulting from an invasion of the right
Valley Realty, 641 P.2d 124, 126 (Utah 1982); Dugan of privacy cannot be measured by a pecuniary stav. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah 1980); Taylor v. ndard is not a bar to recovery *).
"'
Gasor, Inc., 607 P.2d 293, 294 (Utah 7. The jury has broad prerogatives in determining
1980); Rummell v. Bailey, 7 Utah 2d 137, 320 P.2d issues of fact. Evans v. Stuart, 11 Utah 2d 308/410
653, 659 (1958); Pace, 247 P.2d at 274-75. More- P.2d999.1002(1966). . ^ l i ^ s
- over, this court has interpreted Pace to require that 8. There is no evidence in the record and no claims
a complaining party need only 'establish some were made at trial that Inteltech employees harassed
damage." Conder v. A.L. Williams & Assocs., 739
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EXHIBIT B

American Marketing Research & Development
50 SOUTH MAIN STREET
SUITE ( 0 0
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 14144
1801)535-4373

Mr. and Mrs.

Dear Mr. and Mrs.
We would like to officially welcome you on board as consumer product
tester for American Marketing Research and Development. Thank you
for your willingness to work with your area field researcher, Mr. Hyer.
AMRD is an independent marketing firm. AMRD is not affiliated with
any of the corporations or their subsidiaries for whom we do research.
Our unaffiliated status enables AMRD to be totally objective.
Under FTC guidelines, we are required to inform you that: 1) no test
product can or will be sold to you;' 2) you are permitted to terminate
your testing at any point; and 3) all test results are coded for computer use and your name is not associated with them, unless stipulated
by your prior, written consent.
Our marketing existence depends on insightful product analysis from
unbiased consumers like yourself, who have been chosen on a completely
random, demographic basis.
Optimum testing results are obtained when consumers do not alter their
regular routine while using the products. Assimilate your normal usage
as much as possible, if a product does not perform up to expectations,
please let us know. Don't be afraid to report negative results. We
never solicit unfavorable analysis, but such findings can be invaluable
to the manufacturers.
If you ever have questions about a test product, or encounter a problem
with any study, please give me a call at (412) 261-0430.
Sincerely.

k
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/
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-**zA?^

Charles (Chuck) Sortore
Marketing Research Director
C5/lp
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